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Abstract
Background: The usefulness of syndromic surveillance for early outbreak detection depends in
part on effective statistical aberration detection. However, few published studies have compared
different detection algorithms on identical data. In the largest simulation study conducted to date,
we compared the performance of six aberration detection algorithms on simulated outbreaks
superimposed on authentic syndromic surveillance data.
Methods: We compared three control-chart-based statistics, two exponential weighted moving
averages, and a generalized linear model. We simulated 310 unique outbreak signals, and added
these to actual daily counts of four syndromes monitored by Public Health – Seattle and King
County's syndromic surveillance system. We compared the sensitivity of the six algorithms at
detecting these simulated outbreaks at a fixed alert rate of 0.01.
Results: Stratified by baseline or by outbreak distribution, duration, or size, the generalized linear
model was more sensitive than the other algorithms and detected 54% (95% CI = 52%–56%) of the
simulated epidemics when run at an alert rate of 0.01. However, all of the algorithms had poor
sensitivity, particularly for outbreaks that did not begin with a surge of cases.
Conclusion: When tested on county-level data aggregated across age groups, these algorithms
often did not perform well in detecting signals other than large, rapid increases in case counts
relative to baseline levels.
Background
In the short time since syndromic surveillance[1] was
introduced as an early warning system for detecting out-
breaks, considerable effort and expense have gone into
developing syndromic surveillance systems. Although
there have been substantial developments in the methods
and tools used for this practice, the public health value of
the various approaches to syndromic surveillance has
rarely been evaluated. In particular, a critical component
needing further study is the relative accuracy and timeli-
ness of the aberration detection methods of these systems.
In aberration detection, statistical models determine
whether the counts in a given syndrome and day are unu-
sually high and thus worth investigating. Many statistical
algorithms are available, including control-chart-based
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models[2,3], scan statistics[4,5], autoregressive moving
averages[6], and regression models[7,8]. To optimize out-
break detection, surveillance system designers and users
need to understand which methods perform well or
poorly in different settings.
Many studies have described the performance of individ-
ual aberration detection methods [3-10]. However, multi-
ple algorithms have seldom been compared on the same
data [11-14], which is problematic because algorithms
that work well for one data source may not do as well for
another. Further, studies comparing different algorithms
have either tested the algorithms on only a single type of
outbreak[11,14], or have used simulated baseline data
rather than syndrome counts from real systems[12,13].
Using real system data is important, because it is
unknown how well simulated data approximate the rele-
vant features of real syndrome counts. Testing perform-
ance on outbreaks of different temporal distributions and
sizes is important because of the uncertainty about the
types of outbreaks likely to be encountered in practice. To
date, no published studies have systematically compared
detection methods using real syndromic surveillance data.
This lack of comparisons on actual syndromic surveillance
data makes it difficult to select aberration detection meth-
ods objectively.
To address these limitations, we compared the utility of
six commonly-used aberration detection algorithms using
data from our syndromic surveillance system at Public
Health – Seattle & King County. We simulated syndrome
counts that might result from a variety of outbreaks, and
added these to actual daily counts from syndromes mon-
itored by our system. We then evaluated the performance
of the six algorithms on the resulting data.
Methods
Our syndromic surveillance system receives data from 18
of 19 emergency departments (EDs) in King County. Each
morning, EDs send data on all visits that occurred the pre-
vious day, including the date and time of the visit; the
patient's age, sex, and home zip code; a free-text chief
complaint; diagnosis, if available; and disposition. Chief
complaints are classified into syndromes based on the
presence or absence of key words using a modified version
of the chief complaint coder developed by the New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene[15]. For
each syndrome, daily case counts are determined both by
age group and aggregated across age groups. In this study,
we used the aggregated counts. Because historical data
were not available from all EDs when we began this study,
we restricted our analysis to the nine EDs with complete
reporting from 2001–2004.
Because we could not use all of the syndromes we monitor
in this analysis, we chose a representative set by grouping
syndromes into four categories based on their mean daily
counts, and then selecting one syndrome from each
group. The final syndromes we used as baselines had
mean (standard deviation) daily counts of 60 (16.0), 35
(9.9), 10 (4.0), and 2 (1.6) visits per day. These counts
corresponded to ED visits for respiratory illness, influ-
enza-like illness, and asthma syndromes, and pneumonia
hospitalizations, respectively. From these four baselines
we used data from 2001 through 2003 to provide back-
ground counts for the algorithms, and used data from
2004 for testing the algorithms. For each of these syn-
dromes, we calculated the variability in daily counts by
weekday and month using Poisson regression [see Addi-
tional file 1]. Notably, all four baselines had significant
month effects, indicating the presence of seasonal trends.
The four baselines also showed significant day-of-week
effects.
We compared the performance of six aberration detection
methods. We evaluated the three control-chart-based
algorithms commonly referred to as C1, C2, and C3[13].
For C1 and C2, the test statistic on day t was calculated as
St = max(0, (Xt - (μt + k*σt))/σt)
where Xt is the count on day t, k is the shift from the mean
to be detected, and μt and σt are the mean and standard
deviation of the counts during the baseline period. For
C1, the baseline period is (t-7,...,t-1); for C2 the baseline
is (t-9,...,t-3). The test statistic for C3 is the sum of St + St-1
+ St-2 from the C2 algorithm.
We evaluated a generalized linear model (GLM), using a
three-year baseline and Poisson errors, with terms for day
of the week, month, linear time trend, and holidays. The
full model for the expected count on day t was
E(Xt) = β0 + β1(Sunday) + ... + β6(Friday) + β7(January)
+ ... + β17(November) + β18(Holiday) + β19(time trend)
and the test statistic was the probability from a Poisson
distribution of observing at least Xt cases given E(Xt).
We also included two Exponential Weighted Moving
Average (EWMA) models[16], using a 28-day baseline
and smoothing constants of 0.4 (EWMA4) and 0.9
(EWMA9). The smoothed daily counts were calculated as
Y1 = X1; Yt = ω*Xt + (1 - ω)*Yt-1
and the test statistic was calculated as
Tt = (Yt - μt)/[σt*(ω/(2 - ω))1/2]BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2007, 7:6 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/7/6
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where ω is the smoothing constant and other notation as
defined above. The baseline period for μt and σt was set to
(t-30,...,t-3).
Outbreak simulation
Rather than try to model the full outbreak process from
infection to ED visit, as has been done for some limited
outbreak types[17], we tried to model a wide range of out-
break signals, representing various ways that outbreaks in
the community could alter ED syndrome counts. We
based our simulations on the approach described by
Mandl et al[18]. First, we chose five temporal distribu-
tions, using the epidemic curves of historical outbreaks, to
represent several ways in which a pathogen could spread
through a community (Figure 1). These were (a) the air-
borne release of a bioweapon[19]; (b) point-source expo-
sure to an infectious agent[20]; (c) transmission of a
pathogen spread by close contact;[21] (d) transmission of
an airborne pathogen[22]; and (e) transmission resulting
in a multi-modal distribution[23]. Next, we simulated a
range of outbreak signal durations (lasting 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 16,
and 32 days) and a range of sizes using the forecast errors
of the six algorithms[18]. We determined the forecast
errors for each algorithm for each day of 2004, and calcu-
lated the standard deviations of these errors. We set the
size of the largest outbreak signal to be roughly four times
the largest standard deviation, rounded to a convenient
number. The largest standard deviation was 13.2 counts,
and our outbreak signals ranged from 5 to 50 cases in
increments of 5.
Next, we simulated daily outbreak signal counts by creat-
ing every unique combination of the temporal distribu-
tions, durations, and sizes. Since all outbreaks of one day
duration have the same temporal distribution, this gave us
310 different outbreak signals. For each signal, we con-
Temporal distributions used for simulating outbreaks, from the epidemic curves of historic outbreaks, with references Figure 1
Temporal distributions used for simulating outbreaks, from the epidemic curves of historic outbreaks, with references.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2007, 7:6 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/7/6
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verted the epidemic curve of the appropriate historical
outbreak into an empirical probability distribution. We
divided this distribution into the appropriate number of
days for the simulated outbreak. We then calculated the
cumulative probability of a case occurring on or before
day d for each day (1,...,d) of the outbreak signal. Finally,
we assigned each case a random number between 0 and 1,
chosen from a uniform random distribution. The total
number of cases on day d was the sum of all cases whose
random number was greater than the cumulative proba-
bility for day d-1, and less than or equal to the cumulative
probability for day d. This random assignment was
repeated for each of the 310 outbreak signals.
Algorithm testing
We created evaluation datasets by adding the simulated
outbreak signals to each of the four baselines, with the
outbreak counts starting on January 2nd, 2004. To avoid
bias due to day-of-the-week effects and seasonality, we
repeated this process starting the outbreak on every other
day of 2004 for each of the four baselines. This gave us
183 datasets per outbreak per baseline, for a total of
226,920 datasets for analysis.
We applied the six algorithms to the evaluation datasets,
and calculated two outcome measures for each algorithm
on each dataset. The first was whether the algorithm ever
detected the outbreak signal. The second was the earliest
day of an alert, among signals that were detected. The ear-
liest day of alert was counted from the day on which the
first simulated case was added. Due to the stochastic
nature of these simulations, this was not always the first
day of the epidemic. For example, consider a simulated
outbreak signal of five cases 32 days duration started on
January 2nd, 2004. The cases might appear on days 3, 5, 8,
17, and 30 of the signal. In this situation, we would begin
counting the days until detection starting from day 3 (Jan-
uary 4th).
We calculated these outcomes while running the algo-
rithms at an alert rate of 0.01 (an average of one alert every
hundred days). We set this alert rate empirically by apply-
ing each algorithm to each baseline without any added
outbreak signals, and determining the threshold that
would yield an average of one alert per 100 days. Note
that in this study we defined an alert rate, rather than a
false positive rate (which is 1 – specificity). Calculating a
false positive rate (i.e. a specificity) requires assuming that
the baseline syndromes did not contain any signals from
true outbreaks in the community. This is an unreasonable
assumption, given the known yearly influenza epidemics
and the probable presence of other unknown outbreaks.
By using an alert rate instead of a false positive rate, we
allowed for the existence of these signals in our baseline
data.
Comparing algorithm performance
For each of the 310 outbreak signals, in each of the four
baseline syndromes, we computed the sensitivity (that is,
the probability of detecting the signal given the presence
of an outbreak) by averaging the detection outcome
across all 183 analysis runs. We also computed the
median of the earliest day of detection. We used ANOVA
to test for significant differences in the algorithms' sensi-
tivities. Separate tests were conducted by baseline and by
outbreak distribution, duration, and size. In each stratum
of these four grouping variables we tested for significant
differences between algorithms in the probability of
detection. We also tested for differences within each algo-
rithm across the strata. For all ANOVA comparisons that
were significant at the 0.05 level, we compared the per-
formance of all pairs of algorithms by t-test.
We also present a figure showing the performance of one
algorithm on each of the 310 simulated outbreak signals,
at each of the four baselines. Because of the multiple com-
parisons problem, we did not test for significant differ-
ences between the cells of the figure. However, we present
this figure for qualitative comparisons, so that the reader
can visualize the effects of baseline and outbreak temporal
distribution, size, and duration on relative algorithm per-
formance, over the range of outbreak signals we tested
(Figure 2). All simulations and analyses were performed
using SAS version 8.2 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary North Caro-
lina).
Results
Averaged across all baselines and outbreak signals, C1
detected 34% of outbreaks (95% CI 32–35%); C2
detected 39% (95% CI = 37%–41%); C3 detected 36%
(95% CI = 34%–38%); EWMA4 detected 41% (95% CI =
39%–43%); EWMA9 detected 45% (95% CI = 43%–
47%); and the GLM detected 54%(95% CI = 52%–56%).
In general, the probability of detecting an outbreak was
inversely related to average baseline counts (Table 1).
Depending on the algorithm, ability to detect an outbreak
ranged from 11–28% for the syndrome with mean 60 vis-
its per day, to as high as 62–85% for a syndrome with
mean 2 visits per day. Within each baseline, there were
significant differences in sensitivity between the algo-
rithms. Overall, when stratified by baseline, the GLM was
more sensitive than the other algorithms (p-value <
0.0001 for all pairwise comparisons, except compared to
the EWMA methods in the pneumonia hospitalization
syndrome, where p <0.05). The GLM's sensitivity was
highest (85.3%, 95% CI = 82.5%–88.0%) when the base-
line counts were lowest (mean 2 visits per day), and low-
est (27.8%, 95% CI = 25.7%–29.8%) when the baseline
counts were highest (mean 60 visits per day). The relative
performance of C1, C2, C3, EWMA4, and EWMA9 varied
across the four baselines.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2007, 7:6 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/7/6
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Of the algorithms evaluated, only the performance of C1
varied across outbreak distributions (p = 0.002) (Table 2).
C1 had better detection for the point-source distribution
(mean probability of detection 38.1%) compared with
the three community-transmission distributions (p < 0.05
for all pairwise t-tests). Although the other algorithms had
similar patterns of detection, the differences were not sig-
nificant at the 0.05 level. Within each outbreak distribu-
tion, the GLM had better detection compared with the
other algorithms (p < 0.0001 comparing GLM to C1, C2,
or C3; p < 0.01 comparing the GLM to EWMA4 and
EWMA9), with sensitivities as high as 56.5% for both the
airborne bioweapon and the point-source distributions.
The sensitivities of the two EWMA models did not differ
across distributions (p > 0.05 for all comparison).
Across all six algorithms, the probability of detection
increased as the size of the outbreak increased (Table 3).
Within each outbreak size, GLM had better detection than
the other algorithms (p < 0.001 comparing GLM to C1,
C2, or C3; p < 0.05 comparing GLM to EWMA4 or
EWMA9). The probability of detection tended to be low
for all six algorithms even at the largest outbreak sizes (50
extra cases above the baseline), ranging from 52.9% for
C1 (95% CI = 47.0%–58.7%) to 77.4% with GLM (95%
CI = 72.9%–81.9%).
Outbreak duration was inversely related to sensitivity for
all algorithms (Table 4). The probability of detection was
highest for one- and two-day surges in cases. However,
even when all excess cases occurred on a single day, detec-
tion was fairly poor for most algorithms, ranging as low as
44.5% with C3 (95% CI = 31.0%–58.1%). The GLM was
better than all other algorithms at detecting single-day
surges in cases (73.4%, 95% CI = 62.4%–84.4%), with the
exception of EWMA9, where the difference between the
two methods was not significant (p < 0.05). Within each
of the other categories of outbreak duration, the GLM had
Guide to interpreting Figure 3 Figure 2
Guide to interpreting Figure 3.
1 day
5 68 26 29 26 22 30 43 26 22 21 24 22 34
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15 100 100 100 90 84 73 58 100 95 73 76 76 53
20 100 100 100 100 96 91 67 100 100 96 91 88 60
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better detection than the other algorithms (p < 0.001
comparing GLM to C1, C2, or C3; p < 0.05 comparing
GLM to EWMA4 or EWMA9).
Because the GLM generally detected more outbreaks than
the other algorithms when stratified by outbreak size,
duration, distribution, or baseline, we present a more
detailed view of this algorithm stratified by these four fac-
tors simultaneously (Figure 3). As described in Figure 2,
each cell in this figure shows the probability of detecting
an outbreak for different outbreak signals. To allow for
quick qualitative comparisons across outbreak character-
istics, the cells are color-coded and shaded, with colors
indicating the median day of the first alert among detected
outbreaks, and darker shades indicating a higher likeli-
hood of detection.
This stratification suggests several qualitative trends. First,
regardless of distribution, the GLM tended to have low
sensitivity when the baseline counts for a given syndrome
were 35 per day or higher. As shown in Figure 3, outbreak
detection under these circumstances was generally below
80%, except in some situations where the outbreak size
was large relative to the baseline (i.e., 35–40 excess counts
per day) and the surge in cases occurred on a single day.
For example, a single-day surge of influenza-like illness
resulting in 35 cases above the average daily baseline
count of 35 cases was detected in 84% of the tests. That is,
a doubling of the average daily case counts on a single day
Table 2: Mean percent of outbreak signals detected by six aberration detection algorithms, tested on five outbreak distributions, at an 
alert rate of 0.01
Distribution: C1 C2 C3 GLM EWMA 0.4 EWMA 0.9 F value p-value
Airborne bioweapon Mean 37.4% 41.5% 36.5% 56.5% 41.6% 46.9% 12.85 <0.0001
Lower CI* 33.5% 37.5% 32.4% 52.4% 37.5% 42.7%
Upper CI 41.2% 45.4% 40.7% 60.5% 45.8% 51.1%
Point-source Mean 38.1% 41.7% 38.0% 56.5% 42.4% 47.5% 9.49 <0.0001
Lower CI 33.9% 37.3% 33.5% 52.1% 37.7% 42.8%
Upper CI 42.3% 46.2% 42.6% 60.9% 47.0% 52.1%
Community transmission: close contact Mean 32.2% 37.2% 34.6% 53.0% 40.1% 43.7% 12.11 <0.0001
Lower CI 28.3% 33.1% 30.2% 48.7% 35.6% 39.3%
Upper CI 36.0% 41.4% 38.9% 57.3% 44.6% 48.1%
Community transmission: airborne Mean 32.1% 37.5% 34.8% 52.8% 41.2% 44.1% 11.57 <0.0001
Lower CI 28.3% 33.4% 30.4% 48.4% 36.7% 39.6%
Upper CI 36.0% 41.7% 39.2% 57.2% 45.8% 48.6%
Community transmission: multi-modal Mean 28.4% 37.4% 34.4% 52.6% 40.9% 43.9% 15.05 <0.0001
Lower CI 25.1% 33.2% 30.1% 48.2% 36.3% 39.4%
Upper CI 31.7% 41.5% 38.8% 57.0% 45.5% 48.4%
F value 4.39 1.22 0.05 0.86 0.13 0.65
p-value 0.0016 0.30 0.74 0.4881 0.97 0.63
* CI = 95% confidence interval
Table 1: Mean percent of outbreak signals detected by six aberration detection algorithms, tested on four baseline syndromes, at an 
alert rate of 0.01
Syndrome: C1 C2 C3 GLM EWMA 0.4 EWMA 0.9 F value p-value
Pneumonia hospitalizations (mean 2 visits per day) Mean 62.0% 69.3% 72.0% 85.3% 80.5% 79.6% 24.94 <0.0001
Lower CI* 58.3% 65.8% 68.6% 82.5% 77.2% 76.3%
Upper CI 65.8% 72.9% 75.5% 88.0% 83.9% 82.9%
Asthma visits (mean 10 visits per day) Mean 35.4% 52.2% 48.8% 70.0% 52.3% 57.7% 36.63 <0.0001
Lower CI 31.7% 48.5% 45.1% 66.5% 48.6% 53.9%
Upper CI 39.0% 56.0% 52.5% 73.4% 56.0% 61.5%
Influenza-like illness visits (mean 35 visits per day) Mean 21.2% 17.9% 11.1% 34.4% 19.0% 28.2% 84.08 <0.0001
Lower CI 19.6% 16.5% 10.4% 31.9% 17.4% 26.0%
Upper CI 22.9% 19.2% 11.9% 36.9% 20.5% 30.4%
Respiratory visits (mean 60 visits per day) Mean 16.4% 17.1% 10.8% 27.8% 13.3% 15.7% 84.90 <0.0001
Lower CI 15.1% 16.0% 10.3% 25.7% 12.5% 14.5%
Upper CI 17.6% 18.3% 11.4% 29.8% 14.0% 16.9%
F value 205.58 349.50 531.70 398.73 550.30 406.76
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
* CI = 95% confidence intervalBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2007, 7:6 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/7/6
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could be reliably detected 84% of the time. This detection
level dropped to 55–74% (depending on the distribution)
if the excess counts were spread over a period of two days.
Sensitivity was poorer with smaller outbreak sizes. For
Table 3: Mean percent of outbreak signals detected by six aberration detection algorithms, tested on six outbreak sizes, at an alert 
rate of 0.01
Size: C1 C2 C3 GLM EWMA 
0.4
EWMA 
0.9
F value p-value
5 cases Mean 10.4% 11.9% 9.6% 16.0% 10.3% 12.0% 9.55 <0.0001
Lower CI* 8.9% 10.5% 8.3% 14.1% 9.0% 10.6%
Upper CI 11.8% 13.3% 10.9% 18.0% 11.7% 13.5%
10 cases Mean 16.4% 18.8% 15.4% 30.2% 20.2% 22.9% 10.01 <0.0001
Lower CI 13.7% 16.2% 13.0% 25.7% 16.7% 19.0%
Upper CI 19.2% 21.5% 17.9% 34.6% 23.8% 26.7%
20 cases Mean 26.7% 32.2% 29.4% 48.4% 34.8% 38.4% 8.17 <0.0001
Lower CI 22.1% 27.3% 24.3% 42.5% 29.0% 32.7%
Upper CI 31.3% 37.2% 34.5% 54.3% 40.6% 44.2%
30 cases Mean 38.9% 46.2% 42.5% 63.0% 47.8% 52.5% 7.42 <0.0001
Lower CI 33.3% 40.0% 36.0% 57.2% 41.3% 46.1%
Upper CI 44.5% 52.4% 49.0% 68.7% 54.3% 58.9%
40 cases Mean 47.1% 53.7% 50.0% 71.6% 56.4% 61.6% 8.11 <0.0001
Lower CI 41.2% 47.4% 43.2% 66.6% 49.8% 55.4%
Upper CI 53.0% 59.9% 56.9% 76.6% 63.0% 67.7%
50 cases Mean 52.9% 58.8% 53.8% 77.4% 62.7% 67.9% 9.83 <0.0001
Lower CI 47.0% 52.8% 47.0% 72.9% 56.5% 62.2%
Upper CI 58.7% 64.8% 60.6% 81.9% 68.9% 73.7%
F value 35.81 38.67 31.48 64.53 37.68 46.16
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
* CI = 95% confidence interval
Table 4: Mean percent of outbreak signals detected by six aberration detection algorithms, tested on seven outbreak durations, at an 
alert rate of 0.01
Duration: C1 C2 C3 GLM EWMA 
0.4
EWMA 
0.9
F value p-value
1 day Mean 59.8% 58.2% 44.5% 73.4% 52.6% 64.6% 2.58 0.03
Lower CI* 47.5% 45.7% 31.0% 62.4% 39.6% 52.4%
Upper CI 72.2% 70.7% 58.1% 84.4% 65.5% 76.8%
2 days Mean 47.3% 49.1% 42.4% 64.2% 47.9% 55.2% 7.81 <0.0001
Lower CI 42.0% 43.7% 36.7% 59.2% 42.3% 49.8%
Upper CI 52.6% 54.4% 48.0% 69.2% 53.5% 60.7%
4 days Mean 39.6% 43.5% 40.1% 57.7% 43.6% 48.9% 6.43 <0.0001
Lower CI 34.5% 38.2% 34.7% 52.6% 38.2% 43.5%
Upper CI 44.7% 48.8% 45.5% 62.7% 49.1% 54.4%
6 days Mean 33.2% 39.8% 37.6% 54.0% 41.7% 45.5% 7.65 <0.0001
Lower CI 28.5% 34.7% 32.4% 48.9% 36.4% 40.2%
Upper CI 37.8% 44.9% 42.9% 59.0% 47.1% 50.8%
8 days Mean 27.7% 36.4% 34.7% 51.3% 39.2% 42.2% 10.55 <0.0001
Lower CI 23.8% 31.7% 29.8% 46.3% 34.0% 37.2%
Upper CI 31.6% 41.2% 39.7% 56.2% 44.3% 47.3%
16 days Mean 23.0% 31.0% 30.2% 47.7% 36.5% 38.3% 17.22 <0.0001
Lower CI 20.5% 27.4% 26.1% 43.2% 32.0% 33.9%
Upper CI 25.5% 34.6% 34.4% 52.2% 41.0% 42.7%
32 days Mean 26.5% 31.2% 27.4% 47.5% 36.5% 37.5% 36.25 <0.0001
Lower CI 25.5% 29.7% 25.0% 44.2% 33.1% 34.6%
Upper CI 27.5% 32.8% 29.8% 50.8% 39.8% 40.3%
F value 35.81 38.67 31.48 64.53 37.68 46.16
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
* CI = 95% confidence intervalBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2007, 7:6 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/7/6
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example, a single-day surge of 20 cases of influenza-like
illness (a 57% increase over the mean baseline count of 35
cases per day) was detected in less than half (46%) of the
tests.
Second, the GLM's performance was generally better for
situations where the average daily baseline count was
lower (i.e., 10 or fewer cases). In this scenario, the algo-
rithm tended to detect the surge in cases within the first or
second day with high probability (>80%). The probability
Percent of outbreak signals detected, and median timeliness of detection, for the generalized linear model running at an alert  rate of 0.01, for each of 310 outbreak signals on each of four baseline syndromes Figure 3
Percent of outbreak signals detected, and median timeliness of detection, for the generalized linear model running at an alert 
rate of 0.01, for each of 310 outbreak signals on each of four baseline syndromes.
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of detection was directly related to outbreak size and
inversely related to outbreak duration.
Third, there were some qualitative differences in detection
according to outbreak distribution. Distributions where
the bulk of the cases occurred early (such as the airborne
bioweapon) tended to be detected earlier than slowly-
building outbreaks (such as the multi-modal community
transmission).
Discussion
Although public health departments have been quick to
adopt syndromic surveillance systems for outbreak detec-
tion, few studies have demonstrated system effectiveness.
The practical utility of syndromic surveillance depends on
several factors, including the quality and accuracy of the
source data; the sensitivity, specificity, predictive value,
and timeliness of the aberration detection methods; and
the user's response to alerts given by the system. In this
study, we compared the performance of six aberration
detection methods under a broad set of circumstances by
adding simulated outbreak signals to actual daily syn-
drome counts. To our knowledge, this is the largest simu-
lation study comparing syndromic surveillance
algorithms that has been published to date. Our evalua-
tion was based on 310 unique outbreak signals, each of
which was tested on 183 separate dates in each of four
baselines.
Consistent with previous evaluations of syndromic sur-
veillance algorithms[10,12,24], we found that the ability
to detect outbreaks was better with larger outbreaks and
lower baseline counts. We also observed that detection of
a signal of a fixed size increases as the baseline counts
decrease, which has been observed elsewhere[13]. This is
unsurprising, as a fixed signal size causes a greater relative
increase in the case count for a baseline with few daily
cases compared to a baseline with many daily cases. Fur-
thermore, our findings suggest that the temporal distribu-
tion of cases (i.e., the shape of the epidemic curve)
generally does not affect sensitivity but may affect timeli-
ness, which Wang et al. observed in evaluating an autore-
gressive periodic model (APM)[10].
Beyond these general observations, we had two more spe-
cific findings. First, across different baselines, and differ-
ent characteristics of the outbreak signals, the generalized
linear model detected more outbreak signals than the
other five algorithms. This was surprising, as we had
expected to observe more heterogeneity in the relative per-
formance of the algorithms, particularly across outbreak
distributions. Buckeridge et al[25] have suggested that
EWMA9 (which approximates a Shewhart chart) should
outperform EWMA4 on single-day spikes and scattered
signals (such as the multi-modal community transmis-
sion), while EWMA4 should be better on lognormal
curves that increase rapidly (such as the close-contact
community transmission). Furthermore, the control-
chart-based methods have been reported to have good
sensitivity for detection in rare syndromes, with C3 better
suited than C1 and C2 for detecting slowly building out-
breaks[13]. Of note, our baseline syndromes all had
strong day-of-week trends [see Appendix]; since the GLM
included weekday parameters, this may have contributed
to its superior performance relative to the other methods,
which do not correct for such trends[7].
Secondly, although we found that the GLM tended to per-
form better than the other methods, all six algorithms per-
formed poorly in many outbreak scenarios. The
algorithms were generally able to detect large one- or two-
day surges in case counts (where "large" means exceeding
twice or three times the standard deviation of the base-
line), or signals of longer duration that were very large rel-
ative to the baseline. However, these are the types of
signals most likely to be detected by the astute clinician
(in the case of outpatient or ED data) or by an epidemiol-
ogist visually looking for jumps in counts or proportions
in a time series. Aberration detection is most needed for
detecting low-to-moderate increases in cases and for
slowly increasing outbreaks. Yet when run at a rate of one
alert per 100 days, none of the algorithms we tested
detected these types of signals reliably, suggesting that
users run a high risk of missing outbreaks of interest
across a wide range of scenarios.
One feature of Figure 3 deserves mention here. As the
duration of the signal increases, sensitivity appears to fol-
low either a U-shaped trend (when sensitivity is high in
the early days of the outbreak) or to increase with increas-
ing duration. At first glance, this is counter-intuitive, as
the ability to detect a signal of a given size should decrease
as the cases are distributed over more days. In this case,
the superior sensitivity for longer outbreaks does not rep-
resent a real benefit, but rather reflects the fact that there
is a set alert rate of 0.01. An alert unrelated to the presence
of a simulated outbreak, due to variation in the baseline
syndrome counts, will occur roughly once every hundred
days. It is more likely that such an alert will happen by
chance during a simulated signal when that signal occurs
over the course of 32 days than when the signal occurs
over the course of one or two days.
There are several factors which may limit the generaliza-
bility of our findings. First, the results of this study are
modelled on the allocation of cases along epidemic curves
of a fixed distribution, duration, and size. We did not
model the full progression from exposure to disease to
healthcare use, as has been done previously for some lim-
ited outbreak types[17]. Rather, we attempted to cover aBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2007, 7:6 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/7/6
Page 10 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
wide array of the outbreak signals that could occur in prac-
tice. Thus, our results may not be generalizable to all out-
break settings, because the scenarios we produced may
not be entirely representative of the scenarios for which
the algorithms were designed to operate[26]. In addition,
we set the alert rates for each algorithm empirically, by
applying the algorithms to the baseline syndromes and
finding the threshold that would yield approximately one
alert every 100 days. The sensitivity of the algorithms used
in this analysis will likely differ if those same algorithms
are applied in systems that use different thresholds. Fur-
thermore, the thresholds that gave an alert rate of 0.01 in
our data may yield different alert rates in other data, and
may also differ when applied to stratifications of the data,
such as by age categories or geographic groupings.
It is a limitation of the syndromic surveillance literature
that each evaluation has used different baseline data. The
baselines likely differ in terms of random and systematic
variation. Furthermore, published studies have rarely
reported detailed information about their baseline time
series; often, studies have not even reported mean counts
or variances. This limitation makes comparisons between
studies difficult and extrapolation to other datasets uncer-
tain. We included the appendix, with its detail about the
syndromes we used, primarily so that our baselines can be
compared with other time series, at least in terms of mean
counts, day-of-week effects, and seasonal trends. This
gives other users a better basis for comparing our baseline
counts with their own syndromic data. However, there
may be other features of syndromic time series that affect
algorithm performance. The field of syndromic surveil-
lance would greatly benefit from an analysis of the fea-
tures of syndromic time series that impact detection, and
the relative importance of these features.
The poor overall performance of the algorithms we exam-
ined raises another question: Are there other algorithms
that may perform better? Because this study was computa-
tionally intensive, we did not evaluate other algorithms
that have been proposed for syndromic surveillance, such
as autoregressive models[6,24] or the Pulsar method[11].
We were also unable to evaluate scan statistics[4,5] or
other methods that use spatial data, because our simula-
tion method aggregated cases to the county level. Com-
paring our results to prior studies is difficult, not only
because of the different baselines as mentioned above, but
because studies have varied in the alert rates at which they
have tested the algorithms. Prior studies have tended to
use rates between 0.05 (one alert every 20 days) and 0.03
(roughly one alert per month). We feel that these rates are
too high for routine surveillance and could desensitize
users, leading to a reduced likelihood of following up on
any given alert[27]. Because of the problems in comparing
evaluations of algorithms across data sets, it is difficult to
determine whether other algorithms might have per-
formed better on our data. This remains an area for active
research.
Conclusion
The results of this study suggest that commonly-used
aberration detection methods for syndromic surveillance
often do not perform well in detecting signals other than
large, rapid increases in case counts relative to baseline
levels. To the degree that our results are generalizable to
other settings, this poor performance may be a feature of
other systems as well. These results suggest that users
should exercise some caution in reviewing algorithm out-
put. Although the GLM method tended to have better sen-
sitivity overall, there was variability in algorithm
performance across outbreak feature sets, illustrating that
a one-size-fits-all method is unlikely. Additional work is
still needed to develop and evaluate syndromic surveil-
lance algorithms across outbreak signals and to determine
the value of these systems in public health practice.
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